We study three procedures to elicit attitudes towards delayed payments: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure; the second price auction; and the multiple price list. The payment mechanisms associated with these methods are widely considered as incentive compatible, thus if preferences satisfy Procedure Invariance, which is also widely (and often implicitly) assumed, they should yield identical time preference distributions. We find instead that the monetary discount rates elicited using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure are significantly lower than those elicited with a multiple price list. We show that the behavior we observe is consistent with an existing psychological explanation of preference reversals.
Introduction
Incentivized experiments that study choices among delayed rewards have been widely used to measure and test hypotheses about time preferences. Several elicitation methods have been viewed as "incentive compatible" means of eliciting precise information about time preferences. Three such procedures have become workhorse methods in experimental economics, psychology, and neuroeconomics: the multiple price list (MPL), the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) procedure (BDM), and the second price auction (SPA). 1 We study the MPL, the BDM, and the SPA as procedures for eliciting preferences over delayed payments. The MPL is a choice task, in that subjects have to choose between a smaller-sooner and larger-later pair of outcomes. BDM and SPA are instead both instances of matching tasks, in which subjects name a 'sooner' amount they regard as indi↵erent to a later fixed reward. Regardless of these aspects, if the payment mechanism associated with each method is incentive compatible and subjects have preferences over delayed rewards that are invariant to the procedure by which they are elicited, we ought to recover the same distribution of time preferences from each method. With few exceptions, economic experiments using these three methods draw an interpretation of subjects' behavior that implicitly assumes Incentive Compatibility of the payment mechanism and Procedure Invariance of subject preferences. In this paper we instead treat these assumptions as testable, and we test their implications using a between-subject design.
Previous work in experimental economics has noted systematic di↵erences in the rankings of lotteries inferred from their monetary valuations elicited using the BDM as compared to direct choices in choice tasks (e.g. Grether and Plott (1979) ). However, this literature on 'preference reversals' has focused on choice under risk. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing incentivized study that indicates whether analogous preference reversals occur in intertemporal choice. A leading economic explanation of preference reversals under risk is based on the interaction between the random component of the payment mechanism, the risky alternatives, and a failure of the Independence Axiom (e.g. Karni and Safra (1987) ). But such an explanation is highly specific to choice under risk:
there is no compelling reason to expect analogous preference reversals in intertemporal choice. On the other hand, existing work that compares di↵erent experimental techniques 1 The MPL has been used extensively in economics experiments, for example, Coller and Williams 2013)), and thus do not o↵er direct information about economic choices. Incentivized work on methods for measuring time preferences has studied alternative ways to jointly measure a person's discount rate and utility function curvature (e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) , Andreoni et al. (2015) , and Laury et al. (2012) ), but has ignored the possibility that the elicitation procedure used might a↵ect inferences about discounting even when restricted to the domain of dated rewards.
We find a significant di↵erence in subject responses between the MPL and BDM. This is in spite of an implementation ensuring that a subject in each procedure faced exactly the same economic incentives. The direction of this e↵ect is consistent with Tversky et al. 's (1988) scale compatibility hypothesis, according to which a subject responding with a monetary amount in a matching task like BDM will put more weight on monetary outcomes than in a comparable choice task like the MPL.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design. In Section 3 we lay out Incentive Compatibility and Procedure Invariance as testable assumptions, we discuss their implications for our experiment, and we review the predictions of existing economic and psychological explanations of preference reversals for our experiment. We present our results in Section 4 and we discuss them in Section 5.
Experimental design
Our experiment implements a between-subjects design to study three procedures -the MPL, BDM, and SPA -for eliciting each subject's preferences between sooner payments and a fixed later payment. 2 We ran four sessions for each of the three treatments, with 16 inexperienced subjects per session between June 2012 and March 2013. Subjects for each session were recruited from the CEEL database at Università di Trento. All subjects received a e5 participation payment at the end of the session on top of any payments based on their choices. Each subject could only participate in one treatment of the experiment. An average session lasted less than 45 minutes, and the average subject payment was e14.40. 3 The subjects were given instructions that explained the task they would face and how they would be paid based on their choices. Then they completed a comprehension test on the instructions. 4 In each treatment, we use a single elicitation procedure (MPL, BDM, or SPA) to elicit the monetary amount paid tomorrow that would be indi↵erent to the receipt of a e20 at each of three possible delays (1, 2 and 4 months) for each subject. We implemented this by presenting subjects with a screen with three buttons, each corresponding to one of the time horizons. Subjects could enter money amounts in e0.50 increments in all treatments. To avoid any order e↵ects, subjects were free to choose the order in which to tackle each task. 5 After completing each choice task, subjects were sent back to this screen with the buttons corresponding to the time horizons already completed appearing greyed out.
In order to incentivize subjects to report their economic preferences, 50% of the subjects in each group were drawn at random to receive a payment based on their choices. At the end of the experiment we drew from a uniform distribution which 8 subjects (out of 16 participants in each computerized session) would receive a payment in addition to the show up fee; which screen (1 month, 2 months or 4 month delay) would 'count', and, in the case of the MPL or BDM elicitation method, which row or monetary amount would be drawn to determine their payment.
In the second part of the experiment, we test the subjects' awareness of the interest rates implied by their previous choices 6 and measure their personality traits. This part of the experiment was common across all treatments; we discuss these results in the Appendix.
Multiple Price List
In each row of our MPL, a subject chooses between Option A -an amount paid tomorrow that varies between e20 in the first row and decreases to e0.50 in the last row -and Option B, which gives e20 at the later date corresponding to the task. In our implementation 4 20 participants were recruited for each session; to reduce the possibility of subject misunderstanding of the experiment driving our results, we only retained the first 16 subjects to correctly complete the comprehension test. The remaining four subjects in each session were paid a show-up fee and dropped from the session. 5 We study subjects' choices of order by treatment in Appendix C. 6 After all values have been elicited, subjects are asked to state the three annual (non-compound) interest rates that correspond to their choices in each time horizon. For instance, a declaration of e19 in the four month horizon question would have implied an annual interest rate of 15.75%. Subjects were instructed that they would be remunerated at e2 or e1 depending on whether the answer was within a 5% or 10% margin, respectively, of the true rate. We note that a software error a↵ected the payments from this phase to 9 subjects, 4 of whom were paid more than they were entitled to. of the MPL, we enforce a single switching line in each list by having the subject move a slider down the screen to indicate the rows in which she chooses Option A. 7 
Becker-DeGroot-Marshack
Participants in the BDM treatment were asked in each of the three tasks to state the lowest amount L that they would prefer to receive tomorrow instead of receiving e20 at the later date corresponding to that task. For each of the three time horizons, if the value declared was not larger than a value drawn from a uniform distribution with support on {e0.5, e1, . . . , e20}, then the subject would receive a payment equal to the number drawn the following day; otherwise she would get the full amount eL with delay.
Second Price Auction
As in the BDM treatment, participants in the SPA treatment were asked in each of the three tasks to state the lowest amount L for which they would prefer to receive tomorrow instead of receiving e20 at the later date corresponding to that task. For each of the three time horizons, when a subject was paid based on that auction task, if they had the lowest bid they received tomorrow the second-lowest stated amount stated by all subjects; otherwise they received e20 at the later date. The outcome of each auction was not revealed before the next auction was played, as in our other treatments. For this reason, past work has used the MPL, BDM, and SPA procedures to elicit finer information about the entire preference relation on the domain of interest. However, the 7 The strategy space and payment mechanism of the BDM procedure are equivalent to those in the MPL when subjects can only switch at a single line; we enforce single switching in the MPL to make these methods more directly comparable. validity of each method for eliciting preferences relies on some crucial assumptions.
First, preferences cannot depend on economically irrelevant features of the procedure that is used to elicit them -this is the Procedure Invariance assumption. While such an invariance is almost universally assumed, often implicitly so, it is testable. Second, the elicitation method should satisfy the Incentive Compatibility assumption, namely the mechanism determining the payment should induce a subject to truthfully report her preference in each choice. But any experiment that attempts to make multiple observations of a subject's preference relation must decide how multiple choices (that is, preference statements) determine a payment at the end of the experiment. Depending on how a subject's payment is determined from her portfolio of implied preference statements, she may or may not wish to report her true preferences. Which is the case will be driven by her preference over portfolios, given the experiment's payment mechanism. In order to assess whether or not Incentive Compatibility holds, we 'decompose' it further into two testable assumption on preferences. To be more precise, let M = {e0.50, . . . , e20} denote a set of monetary payments and let T = {1 day, 1 month, 2 months, 4 months} denote a set of payment dates. In the standard economic approach to decision-making (e.g. Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)), a subject has a single transitive preference relation % over dated rewards in M ⇥ T , and this preference is procedure invariant, as explained above. The
Monetary Monotonicity property requires that subjects prefer more money to less given a fixed horizon. Formally, % satisfies Monetary Monotonicity if for any m, m 0 2 M , m > m 0 implies (m, t) (m 0 , t) for any t 2 T .
In our implementation of the MPL, such a subject makes a choice in each row of the MPL, which determines a smallest value m MP L,t 2 M for which the subject picks m MP L,t , 1 day over (e20, t). In our implementations of the BDM and SPA, a subject is asked to state an amount m i,t (i 2 {BDM, SPA}) for each of t = 1m, 2m, 4m. With ; denoting exclusion from payment, the payment mechanism corresponding to procedure We wish to interpret a report of m i,t as implying the preference statements (m, 1 day) (e20, t) (m 0 , 1 day) for any m, m 0 2 M satisfying m > m i,t > m 0 . Since our payment mechanism is a Savage act, whether a subject's report admits such an interpretation depends on her preferences over acts. As shown in Azrieli et al. (2015) , such an interpretation will be appropriate if the subject has transitive preferences over M ⇥ T that satisfy Monetary Monotonicity and an additional property called Eventwise Monotonicity. Intuitively, Eventwise Monotonicity holds whenever an act that yields more preferred dated rewards in each state as compared to another is also ranked higher by the pref- 
Our discussion of the implications of properties of preferences for the incentive compatibility of experimental methods is summarized in the observation below. 
Alternative Hypotheses
Incentives. Economic theories that maintain the existence of procedure invariant economic preferences have posited that the payment mechanism could be responsible for preference reversals in BDM in the domain of choice under risk (Karni and Safra (1987)),
violating Eventwise Monotonicity. 10 Karni and Safra's theory relies on the fact that in choice under risk, a subject's choices combined with a random problem selection mechanism with objectively given probabilities determines a compound lottery; a subject who reduces compound lotteries will only want to report their preferences over lotteries if she has expected utility preferences. In the domain of delayed payments, none of our payment mechanisms forms a compound lottery and there is no obvious analogue of reduction. Thus we see no compelling reason why incentives ought to generate di↵erences across treatments according to Karni's and Safra's theory. Moreover, since the exact same objectively-given randomization process is used in MPL and BDM mechanisms, according to this theory there is no possibility of incentive-driven preference reversals between the MPL and BDM treatments. This theory allows for behavior in the MPL and BDM treatments to di↵er from the SPA treatment, since in the SPA treatment uncertainty about one's own payment arises from other subjects' behavior, rather than by an objective randomization device, hence the di↵erence between BDM and SPA in part 2 of our Observation. 11
Response mode. The MPL has a subject respond with her row-by-row choices (a choice task), while the BDM and SPA ask a subject to state a monetary amount to a later payment that would make her indi↵erent between the sooner monetary amount and a e20 later payment (matching tasks). Tversky et al. (1988) argue that the response mode can a↵ect the weight that a decision-maker places on each of multiple attributes, which is inconsistent with procedure invariant economic preferences. Their scale compatibility hypothesis posits that subjects in matching tasks will put more weight on the matched 2015)). 11 Another conjecture related to all three payment mechanisms is that subjects might be particularly sensitive to risk in the amount paid given their choices, as in the "uncertainty e↵ect" of Gneezy et al. (2006) , and this might lead to a mass of e20 responses. We discuss this conjecture in Appendix D.
hypothesis predicts that m MP L,t < m BDM,t = m SP A,t for any subject.
Confusion in BDM. Cason and Plott (2013) hypothesize that many subjects incorrectly believe that they will receive the payment stated in the BDM should a "winning" number be drawn; akin to misperceiving that BDM ((m, t)) = m BDM,t , t whenever m m BDM,t . 12 If preference % ? satisfies Eventwise Monotonicity but a subject misperceives BDM as such, she would pick m BDM,t > m MP L,t . However, Cason and Plott are silent on how subjects would behave in a SPA against human bidders with nearly identical instructions.
Biases in Auctions. Previous research has documented a bias towards overbidding one's value in second price auctions with induced private values (Kagel and Levin (1993) ) and also with private homegrown values (as compared to bids in BDM; Rutström (1998) ).
One hypothesis is that this arises due to a desire to win in a competitive environment. In our experiment, this would lead to lower bids in the SPA treatment.
Biases in MPL. Previous work has suggested that the fixed side of a MPL may create a reference point (Sprenger (2015) ) or status-quo (Castillo and Eil (2015) ) to which subjects are biased, in violating procedurally invariant economic preferences. In our design, this would predict that m MP L,t > m BDM,t , m SP A,t absent other biases. Others have suggested a bias towards switching in the middle of a list (e.g. Andersen et al. (2006) , who find no evidence of such a bias in intertemporal choices), which, assuming m BDM,t > 10, would predict that m MP L,t < m BDM,t , m SP A,t . Another hypothesis is that a subject's first choice in an MPL creates an 'anchor', and subsequent choices in the list are biased towards the side of the initial choice; for any subject who initially chooses e20 tomorrow over e20 at t 2 {1 month, 2 months, 4 months}, this bias would predict m MP L,t < m BDM,t , m SP A,t .
Results
We find that subjects' responses are consistently the lowest in the MPL and highest in the BDM ( We use rank-sum tests to test whether subjects' responses di↵er systematically by procedure. The di↵erence between responses in the MPL and BDM is significant in two of the three horizons at the 5% significance level ( We use regression techniques to conveniently summarize how inferred monetary discount rates di↵er across treatments. 13 We wish to estimate the regression equation:
The variable r it denotes the monthly monetary discount rate inferred (under the assumptions of Monetary Monotonicity and Eventwise Monotonicity) from subject i's behavior in horizon t, MP L, BDM, SP A are treatment dummies, X it denotes additional controls, and ✏ denotes an error term. However, even under these assumptions our treatments only measure an interval for r it given i's response in horizon t. In specifications 3 and 4 (Table   3 ), we use interval regressions to account for this under the assumption that the ✏ it are independently and normally distributed. Specification 3 includes no control variables in X, while specification 4 includes time horizon dummies to account for the possibility of non-constant discounting over monetary amounts. We assume that discount rates are weakly positive; thus values of r it are bounded below by 0 and the empirical distribution of r it is rightly skewed with a mode close to 0. For this reason, the normality assumption embedded in the interval regression is highly inappropriate for our data. 14 In specifications 1, 2, 5, and 6 we use least squares estimators with the minimum of the inferred interval of discount rates as the left-hand side variable as checks on the robustness of the interval regression. 15 We use ordinary least squares to estimate in specifications 1 and 2 13 Our inferred monetary discount rates measure do not account for the possibility that individuals discount their utility of payments and have a curved utility-for-money function. A subject's utility-formoney function is not separately identified from her discount rate on our domain, even if we assumed power utility-for-money functions. This mechanically implies that the inferred discount rates here will exceed that of studies that assume a curved utility-for-money function.
14 We note that an application of interval regression based on an asymmetric distribution for ✏ it might be feasible, but would be di cult to interpret. We obtain similar results across specifications (Table 3 ). Focusing on our results from the interval regression (specification 3), the inferred monetary discount rate is highest in the MPL (.380), lowest in the BDM (.192), and intermediate in the SPA (.266). The di↵erence between the MPL and BDM is statistically significant (p = .01) but the di↵erence between the MPL and SPA is not (p = .15), nor is the di↵erence between the BDM and SPA (p = .20). We obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results using both ordinary least squares and generalized least squares random e↵ects with the minimum of the inferred interval of discount rates as the left-hand side variable, and also if we include time horizon dummy variables to account for non-constant monetary discount rates. In each specification in Table 3 , the inferred discount rate is on average .18-.19 higher in the MPL than in the BDM, a significant di↵erence at the 5% level, while the inferred average discount rates in the SPA treatments do not significantly di↵er from either of the other two treatments.
Inferred Discount
to lead to a slight downward bias in estimated discount rates.
Discussion
We found evidence of a substantial di↵erence in the discount rates inferred from subjects in the MPL as compared to the BDM. In our data, this bias is only significant on shorter horizons, and thus a↵ects not just inferred discount rates, but also inferences about how discount rates vary with horizon. Since the BDM and MPL elicitation schemes have the same incentive structure, the di↵erence we find violates Procedure Invariance. The Since there are systematic albeit statistically insignificant di↵erences between behavior in the SPA and the other two methods, we view these di↵erences as merely suggestive.
We note that Cason and Plott do not state whether an analogous mistake ought to occur in an SPA setting with multiple human bidders. In our context we see such an extension as natural. Such a mistake, however, would (counterfactually) predict underbidding in private value SPAs. In contrast, the conjunction of the scale compatibility hypothesis and a previously documented bias towards making winning bids in auctions could explain why bids in the SPA tend to be higher than in those in the BDM.
We note that findings from past intertemporal choice experiments that use the MPL have not provided evidence of any inconsistency with the combination of Eventwise Monotonicity and Procedure Invariance (Andersen et al. (2006) ). Since the MPL is most common in economics experiments studying intertemporal choice, our results suggest that the profession might benefit from coordinating on the MPL as standard practice for future studies where context-dependence is not a variable of interest in order to make results more comparable across studies.
However, we also note that subjects' inferred discount rates in our experiment are an order of magnitude larger than market interest rates in Italy. One might view this as prima facie evidence against the existence of procedure invariant economic preferences. Our findings are not unusual in this regard: the discount rates inferred from past incentivized experiments span from negative to infinite ( We believe that the evidence we have provided demonstrates the potential value of incorporating context-dependence into economic theories of intertemporal choice (like that of Tversky et al. (1988)). Such models could be particularly valuable for analyzing the results of economic experiments. We submit that, if our goal is to use economic experiments to better understand real world decisions, future experimental work on the elicitation of "time preferences" ought to treat context-dependence as a variable of interest rather than an issue to be ignored or treated as a confound. 
A.1 Sheet 1 (common to all treatments)
This experiment studies choice over time. Please read carefully the instructions that follow while an assistant also reads them aloud. You will be given a fixed participation fee at the end of the experiment. Moreover you may be able to receive an additional sum on top of the participation fee. This additional amount will depend on your choices and on a random draw. More precisely, you will have one chance in two to be drawn to receive the additional payment.
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to complete a questionnaire. The information collected will be used solely for research purposes. The information collected will be kept completely anonymously.
Click 'NEXT' to continue.
A.2 Sheet 2 A.2.1 MPL TAKING PART IN THE EXPERIMENT
By participating in this experiment you have one chance in two of being drawn to receive a monetary amount. We will ask you shortly to make some choices between monetary rewards payable at di↵erent points in time. All the choices, presented in a Option A instead is di↵erent on all rows, and varies between a minimum of e0.50 and a maximum of e20. Careful! You must make a choice in each row. To do so you will have to use the cursor in the middle of the screen: you can scroll it using the mouse to select the option that you prefer in each row. You will see three tables in total, di↵ering from one another only for the delay with which the e20 of option B are payable.
Three random draws will take place at the end of the experiment. The first will draw one of the three screens, the second will draw one of the forty rows from that screen, and the third will draw the participants which will receive the additional payment, corresponding to the choice made in the row drawn. This means that if you are drawn to receive a payment, the amount of money you will receive will be that corresponding to the option (A or B) that you chose in the row drawn. This means that each choice you will make in each of the three tables may be rewarded.
Click 'NEXT' to continue

A.2.2 BDM TAKING PART IN THE EXPERIMENT
By participating in this experiment you have one chance in two of being drawn to receive e20, which will be payable with a delay of some weeks. However you will have the opportunity to anticipate receipt to tomorrow. In this case you will have to give up part of the total amount. Very shortly you will see a screen where you will be able to declare the minimum amount you are prepared to receive in place of the full e20 to receive your payment tomorrow, entering a value between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 steps. After your choice a number between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 increments will be drawn at random.
Every value between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 increments has the same probability of being drawn How much is the early payment?
If you are drawn for payment: 1) if your declared value smaller or equal to the one drawn, you will be entitled to receive tomorrow an amount of money equal to the number drawn.
2) if your declared value is larger than the one drawn, you will be entitled to the full e20 but with delay.
How much to declare?
If you think about it, you will see that the best option for you is to declare the amount that makes you indi↵erent between receiving such amount tomorrow or the whole e20 with delay. Consider for instance the two extreme values, namely e0.50 and e20. If you declare e0.50, you will be sure that, if drawn for payment, you will receive your payment tomorrow, but you could earn as little as e0.50 in case the number drawn is e0.50. If you declare e20 you will be sure that, if drawn for payment, you will receive the whole e20 albeit with delay: the exception is if e20 is drawn, in which you would receive e20
tomorrow. Yet even in this case if the declaration which makes you indi↵erent is less than e20, by declaring such value you would receive e20 tomorrow anyway.
You will be shown three screens in total, which di↵er only for the delay with which the full e20 are payable.
Three random draws will take place at the end of the experiment. The first will draw one of the three screens, the second will draw a number between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 increments, and the third will draw the participants who will receive a payment corresponding to the choices made. This means that if you are drawn to receive a payment, the amount of money you will receive will be based on the choice you made in the screen drawn. This means that each choice you will make in each of the three screens may be rewarded.
Click 'NEXT' to continue
A.2.3 SPA TAKING PART IN THE EXPERIMENT
By participating in this experiment you have one chance in two of being drawn to receive e20, which will be payable with a delay of some weeks. However you will have the opportunity to anticipate receipt to tomorrow. In this case you will have to give up part of the total amount. Very shortly you will see a screen where you will be able to take part in an auction to anticipate the payment to tomorrow. As the other participants, you will have to declare the minimum amount you are prepared to receive in place of the full e20 to receive your payment tomorrow, entering a value between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 steps. The participant declaring the lowest value will acquire the right to receive the payment earlier. If two or more participants have inserted the same minimum value, all of these participants will acquire the right to receive the payment earlier.
How much is the early payment?
If you are drawn for payment: 1) if your declared value is the smallest, you will be entitled to receive tomorrow an amount of money equal to the lowest of all the other declarations excluding yours. Thus in case of a draw with one or more participants, such lowest value will be the same as the one you declared.
2) if your declared value is not the smallest, you will be entitled to the full e20 but with delay.
Suppose for instance that there are only two participants, Jane who declares ex and John who declares ey, and suppose that they are both drawn to receive payment. If ex is smaller than ey, Jane gets the right to early payment, and will receive ey tomorrow, while John will receive e20 with delay; if ex is larger than ey, Jane will receive e20 with delay while John gets the right to early payment, and will receive ex tomorrow; if ex and ey are the same, then both Jane and John will receive ex=ey tomorrow.
How much to declare?
If you think about it, you will see that the best option for you is to declare the amount that makes you indi↵erent between receiving such amount tomorrow or the whole e20 with delay. Consider for instance the two extreme values, namely e0.50 and e20. If you declare e0.50, you will be sure that, if drawn for payment, you will receive your payment tomorrow, but you could earn as little as e0.50 in case another participant has also declared e0.50. If you declare e20 you will be sure that, if drawn, you will receive the whole e20 albeit with delay: the exception is if everybody else has also declared e20, in which case everybody will have the right to early payment. Yet even in this case if the declaration which makes you indi↵erent is less than e20, by declaring such value you would be the only participant to get the right for early payment, and would receive e20 tomorrow anyway.
Two random draws will take place at the end of the experiment. The first will draw one of the three screens, the second will draw the participants who will receive a payment corresponding to the choices made. This means that if you are drawn to receive a payment, the amount of money you will receive will be based on the choice you made in the screen drawn. This means that each choice you will make in each of the three screens may be rewarded. If drawn, your earnings will be determined as follows:
Click 'NEXT' to continue
1. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the table drawn is within ±5% of the simple annual interest rate corresponding to your choice, you will earn e2;
2. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the table drawn di↵ers more than ±5% but not more than ±10% from the simple annual interest rate corresponding to your choice, you will earn e1;
3. for larger di↵erences, or if you do not enter any value, you will earn nothing.
Click on 'NEXT' to continue
A.3.2 BDM and SPA
INTEREST RATE PHASE
In the next screen you will have the possibility, if drawn, to earn additional money.
We will ask you to enter the three simple annual interest rates corresponding to the choices you made in the three preceding screens.
If drawn, your earnings will be determined as follows:
1. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the version drawn is within ±5% of the simple annual interest rate corresponding to your choice, you will earn e2;
2. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the version drawn di↵ers more than ±5% but not more than ±10% from the simple annual interest rate corresponding to your choice, you will earn e1;
3. for larger di↵erences, or if you do not enter any value, you will earn nothing. 
B Predictions of Discount Rates Implied by Choices
In the last phase of the experiment, we verified (in an incentived way) subjects' perceptions of the interest rates implied by their choices, as was indicated to subjects in the instructions. The elicitation method seems to have no e↵ect on subject prediction errors.
In Table 4 , we show the distribution of prediction errors by time horizon. 
Number of subjects
C Order e↵ects
One novel aspect of our design is that we allow each subject to select her preferred order of the three tasks. The instructions are the same across treatment with the exception of the description of the procedure in question; also, the selection screen was constant across treatments. Table 5 shows the number of subjects by treatment and the order they selected. In all treatments, by far the most common order of horizons was 1 month, 2 month, then 4 month, though this order is slightly less predominant in the MPL treatment compared to the BDM and MPL.
A Fisher's exact test finds significant association between treatment and order (p = 0.015).
One might next ask whether order appears to mediate the di↵erences in monetary discount rates across treatments. To investigate whether this is the case, we display the conditional mean of responses by order and treatment in Table 6 .
Ignoring cells in Table 6 with only a single observation, we can see that, conditional on the order, the average response in the MPL treatment always lies below that in the BDM treatment, with the single exception being the comparison in the four month horizon between subjects who responded in order 4,2,1 a comparison involving a total of 13 subjects between the MPL and BDM treatments that appears consistent with sampling variation. Moreover, in the BDM and MPL treatments the conditional means by order appear to be consistent with the hypothesis of no order e↵ects, again given reasonable sampling variation. Thus we conclude that, even if order e↵ects are present, they cannot explain the di↵erence we find between responses in the MPL and BDM on the one and two month horizons.
In the SPA treatment, the 15 subjects who respond to the 2 month horizon first exhibit higher discount rates on all horizons compared to other subjects in the SPA treatment. However, when comparing these subjects to the remaining subjects in the SPA, these di↵erences are only statistically significant in a t-test for the 1 month horizon (p = 0.04, 0.24, 0.20 for the 1, 2, and 4 month horizons, respectively). Since we fail to see a consistent direction of e↵ect across treatments, this seems best attributable to sampling variation. Two months Four months  MPL  15  11  15  BDM  21  21  19  SPA  19  13  11   Table 7 : Number of e20 bids by treatment and horizon D The uncertainty e↵ect Gneezy et al. (2006) find evidence that, in some cases, people will value a risky lottery less than its worst possible outcome. They term this phenomenon the "uncertainty e↵ect".
One month
A related concern to our discussion of incentive-based hypotheses in (as compared to risk with objectively-given probabilities), then we ought to expect such e20 bids to be more likely in the SPA treatment.
We report the number of e20 bids in each treatment and horizon in Table 7 . Across all treatments and horizons, 25% of responses are at e20. While, in each horizon, there are more e20 bids in the BDM treatment than in any other treatment, on no horizon are these di↵erences statistically significant at the 5% level using Fisher's exact test of proportions.
E The HEXACO personality inventory
The conventional 'Big Five' personality traits (CANOE: Conscientiousness, Agreableness, Neuroticism, Openness, Extraversion) have been found to be unsatisfactory when used to assess personality traits in non anglophone populations (see e.g. Lee and Ahston (2008) ).
For this reason we have instead relied on the HEXACO personality inventory, which concentrates on six personality traits: Honest, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreableness,
Conscientiousness and Openness to experience. Each trait has five subtraits. Subjects were asked a total of 60 personality questions, with each group of 10 assessing a di↵erent trait. Given that we 'only' have 192 subjects overall, we do not have enough data for a proper analysis using these traits as regressors. For this reason, we do not discuss personality measures in the body of the paper.
We report below some summary statistics to show that the subjects in each treatment were fairly homogeneous in terms of personality traits. We present these summary statistics both by treatment in Table 8 . To evaluate whether any of the di↵erences across treatments are statistically significant, we regress the measure of each trait above on treatment dummies. None of our tests for equality of treatment dummy coe cients reject the null hypothesis of equality in that personality trait in each treatment at the 5% significance level.
E.1 HEXACO questions
The HEXACO personality inventory questions in the English version follow below (from Lee and Ashton (2008)).
DIRECTIONS
On the following pages you will find a series of statements about you. Please read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then write your response in the space next to the statement using the following scale: 5 = strongly agree 4 = agree 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 2 = disagree 1 = strongly disagree Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response.
Please provide the following information about yourself.
Sex (circle): Female Male
Age: years (we also added indication of the discipline to which student participants belonged) 34. In social situations, I'm usually the one who makes the first move.
35. I worry a lot less than most people do.
36. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
37. People have often told me that I have a good imagination.
38. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time.
39. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me.
40. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends.
41. I can handle di cult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else.
42. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
43. I like people who have unconventional views.
44. I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.
45. Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
46. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am.
47. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time.
48. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
49. I don't think of myself as the artistic or creative type.
50. People often call me a perfectionist.
51. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.
52. I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person.
53. Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel like panicking.
54. I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
55. I find it boring to discuss philosophy.
56. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.
